Probably every responsible attitude toward the American presence in Vietnam and its foreign policy implications--will there ever be ""another Vietnam?"" --is put forth here in papers and discussions by 27 experts on public policy problems. Pfeffer, a fellow of the Adlai Stevenson Institute which sponsored the symposium (in June, 1968), has shortened the presentations but made no attempt at a synthesis and there is no ultimate consensus. In Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s view, for example, responsibility for ""the Vietnam problem"" lies mainly in ""the growth of a warrior caste."" But Richard J. Barnet, in a much-attacked paper, ?ults ""the structure and organization of the national security bureaucracy"" rather than the military, the President, or his advisers. There is disagreement on the basic facts--the time-table of escalation and even the formal rationale--as well as on the philosophical validity (and efficacy) of future interventions. In every case, however, the position is carefully argued and debated. Other contributors include Theodore Draper, John Fairbank. Henry Kissinger, Edwin Reischauer, and Adam Yarmolinsky. A useful contribution to the dialogue on Vietnam.