Who was really to blame for Pearl Harbor? Was there a conscious conspiracy in Washington, offering the harbor and our Fleet as bait so as to get us into World War II? These and countless related questions will doubtless remain to be kicked around by ""revisionist"" historians for many years to come. This author has no pet theory to put forward, but rather, in his ""Quest For A Far Eastern Naval Policy"", he tends toward the more conservative approach:""...the inexorable tide of events caused muddled thinking, unrealistic estimates, and clumsy decisions. It did not inspire calculated treachery"". Basically, this is the story of that phenomonenally consistent kind of thinking, estimates, and decisions which was our Pacific naval policy--or policies, since nearly everyone in every branch of the government and armed services apparently had one of his own--during the 1930's. A fascinating story it is, every step of the way, with its sources deeply obscured within the basic conflict in American foreign policy, between the forces of isolationism and imperialism, which was the unresolved legacy of the Spanish-American War. ""The best military and naval resources of a nation break down when that nation's foreign policy lacks clarity and realism,"" concludes Mr. Tuleja, and his well-wrought text provides an excellent demonstration of that lesson.