In this latest historiographic offshoot of Fritz Fischer's seminal Griff nach der Weltmacht, Carr, a reader in modern history at the University of Sheffield, offers a detailed analysis of ""the conquest of land in the east and its ruthless Germanization"" as the rationale for Hitler's diplomatic and military maneuverings in the prewar years. From the very beginning, says Carr, ""the commitment to violence"" and imperial conquest remained finn; the Nazis were never, as they pretended to be, interested in the marginal improvement of existing frontiers; nor was the often heard lament about ""German minorities"" anything but a cynical exploitation of the Allies' preference for national self-determination. Hitler, like many Germans before him, realized that Germany's Achilles' heel was her dependence on world markets for essential raw materials and foodstuffs. Germany lacked fuel, rubber, grain, etc.; only by transforming Eastern Europe into a huge colonial dependency could the cherished goal of autarky be achieved. And economic self-sufficiency was, Hitler, believed, a prerequisite to the full-scale war against the West which he was planning. Cart's book is a careful and integrated study of German rearmament and the consequent ""overheated economy"" which imposed its own exigencies. From the Anschluss with Austria to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, to the invasion of Poland, the Drang nach Osten remained the objective and many of Hitler's seemingly paradoxical domestic policies and diplomatic feints during the '30's can be understood only in this light. A convincing study of ideology and political pragmatism which invites rebuttals and addenda from other specialists in the field.