A sane and positive estimate of the cold war -- causes and possible remedies. Beginning with first hand observations of the early diplomatic rumblings after the war, the author follows negotiations under Roosevelt -- stillborn efforts for understanding under Truman. Russian overtures in pleas for loans and credit, a plan pushed by Nelson and favored by Roosevelt to aid our own post-war market and establish good will, were unsuccessful; a refusal of the Allies to permit large reparations from Germany became a rallying point for Russia; and there remained in the Russian minds a suspicion -- engendered by distrust of British imperialism and a rightist awing in America unfavorable to Russian policy. The author follows closely the struggles for a united and effective policy under Truman -- and the disheartening results -- with the United States, traditionally the champion of oppressed peoples, offering no ideological competition to Russia, supporting as we have been forced to do in the interests of our ""strong situation"" policy, unpopular, archaic and decadent regimes in borderline countries. Four points for peace are suggested -- internal economic measures designed to take up the slack due to decreasing of military powers, to lessen the danger of relying upon a ""military solution"" to depression; a long-range commitment to help under-developed areas abroad; a support of genuinely democratic and popular leaders in the countries to whom we give aid; and a willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union. On the whole this is a plea for a rational, sincere program for peace. An exciting book -- but watch out for the fireworks -- controversial material on a popular level. The author was an assistant to Donald Nelson and in 1944 became a member of Roosevelt's Staff as Economic Adviser. Since the war he has been a consultant to the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency and to President Truman.