No text by the leader of the exiled Republic of China on the Soviet Russia in China can be ignored. This book is actually three- or more- books in one. It is a somewhat surprisingly objective historical record of thirty odd years of Communist penetration of China, stemming back to Sun Yat Sen's idealistic aims, his mistaken assumption that the Soviet ""smiling diplomacy"" was authentic, and that China's aims could be sustained; and going forward to the situation today, with China virtually in Moscow's pocket. In between, Russian Communism schemed to use the national revolution to its own ends, toyed with Japanese aggression, created issues with foreigners, stalled the Kuomintang's successive efforts to unify China, made promises only to break or circumvent them, set up in Sinkiang the prototype of puppet governments under Moscow surveillance everywhere. While the years of civil war, of Sino-Japanese war, of world war are telescoped, singularly little space is given to the Korean War, with the exception of the conclusion where he blames the stalemate on the refusal to allow participation of Republic of China forces. Another- and to this reader the most significant part of the text- is the thoughtful analysis of the causes of failure of the Republic of China, of the abortive efforts of the Western free world to mediate, of the steps by which the Communist penetration was achieved. He does not hesitate to acknowledge divisiveness in his own forces, nor to face the shortcomings. Nor does he stop at criticism of the West. A third part of the book is the conclusion, the analysis of the courses open, the mistakes to avoid, the facts to face, the necessity of substituting local war in East Asia with conventional weapons, for world war with nuclear weapons. Not easy reading at any point.