This is a concise military account of the Battle of France of 1940 which had such unexpected and disastrous results for the world. Colonel Goutard piles up enough evidence to show that the French defeat was not caused by any defect in the French soldier or any actual lack of equipment. Rather it was aided and abetted by the extreme conservatism of the French military leaders who based their strategy of ""containment along a continuous unbroken front"" on World War I experiences. The French army was thus equipped with slow, unmaneuverable material in accordance with this strictly defensive military philosophy and could not cope with the tactical surprise and speed of the German attack. In addition, the French generals made a number of crucial mistakes in organization and defense which made the breakthrough at Sedan all the more possible. Never were so many opportunities missed and so little done with so much, according to Col. Goutard, who places the blame for the defeat where it belongs. He covers a great deal of ground in short space and teaches a valuable lesson: that an army is as good as its leaders who must have the flexibility of mind to anticipate the novel tactics of its enemy. There is a foreword by Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart. A defined market.