A selling history of espionage rests its cause mainly with the U.S. official performance and the recessive to dominant waves of recognition of our need for official, operational intelligence. The interplay of Rebel and Northern spies during the Civil War, operating from no central base, gave way to the Military Intelligence Division of the Adjutant General's Office during the Spanish-American War -- when the of Aguinaldo in the Philippines was a major coup. Operations out of 40 OB by brilliant Admiral Hall of England in World War I brought revelations that finally turned Wilson to the necessity of war. The functioning of spies on American in World War I carried the cause of counter-espionage home. Following such greats as Nolan and Van Deman, the years between World War I and II when intelligence anguished, with the previous Corp of Intelligence Police drastically undermanned, to the author ""the shameful years"" leading to Pearl Harbor, a catastrophe calmly explored. The OSS, followed by the CIA, and now the Department of Defense Intelligence Agency with its new frontier re-organization and attendant problems of the ""holding corporation"", do not go unrecorded in a book strong and persuasive for organized intelligence, preferably with official handling by the military. More over-all than Joachim Joesten's They Call It Intelligence (1185, 1962), more organizationally oriented than Ronald Seth's The Anatomy of Spying (1056, 1962), and perhaps best suited for library coverage.