THE LONG WAR

Former BBC journalist Loyn turns a gimlet eye on the war in Afghanistan, the longest in the history of the U.S.

“This is not a failed nation but a nation that has been failed,” writes Loyn, who was on hand for many significant moments of the war. Afghanistan has been failed, he enumerates, by a confused military doctrine. American forces invaded on the premise that it was best to fight and get out rather than engage in nation-building; the U.S. saw itself “not as an imperial invader but a force for good, spreading enlightenment and democracy.” Some of the other coalition forces were less sure: A German senior officer sharply reminded an American commander that only part of the job was military, the rest political, while “British troops went into Iraq and Afghanistan with a confident swagger, believing that centuries of imperial experience made them uniquely well suited to the complex work required.” As it is, writes Loyn, the U.S. forces turned out to be the more effective, though there was plenty of learning to be done. They had little idea of the political and ethnic makeup of the country and not much sense that they had to focus on stabilizing the country for the great mass of the people as well as on destroying the Taliban, who could have been neutralized early on, given better handling. On that score, Loyn charges that the Taliban were willing to surrender, but Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. secretary of defense and manager of the war, rejected the offer. While early U.S. commanders asked Rumsfeld to sideline coalition forces, later ones came to rely on their allies, only to fear “a domino effect, where other nations followed France and pulled out early.” Loyn’s pages are steeped in tragic misinterpretation and always with a sympathy for ordinary people who deserved much better.

A well-executed and dispiriting study of imperial overreach and cultural collision.