Perhaps it is too soon, even now, to expect anything like a comprehensive account of ""the bloodiest battlefield yet between the two dominant philosophies of our age"". But it should be remarked that Mr. Rees' study is as analytically comprehensive as anything which has appeared on the subject so far, and this despite his rigid adherence to one main point of view: that the Korean ""police action"" marked the defeat of the ""liberal-puritan"" tradition in American foreign policy (as subscribed to by Woodrow Wilson, FDR, and Douglas MacArthur) which saw war as a last resort, an all-out crusade divorced from any political considerations. Truman and Acheson inaugurated the new era of limited war for purposes of containment, warfare with political gain rather than a victor's poils paramount. Mr. Rees not only approves of the limited-war approach, but maintains in a most persuasive manner that it is the only possible way for the West to resist the pressure of Communist expansion. His picture is thus much less of the oxhole than of the conference table. Another limitation, his British citizenship, works two ways: more of English policy is included than an American reader might consider germane, but at the same time a valuable distance is achieved in his analysis of U.S. party-politics and their influence upon world events.