The initial feeling of security given by the atom bomb to United States military personnel has turned in the minds of many to a wracking anxiety. Among the most articulate and informed of the apprehensive is General Maxwell D. Taylor, who between 1955 and 1959 served in the capacity of Chief of Staff of the United States Army. His contention that the use of the atom is now accessible to Russia as well as the United States and, therefore, no longer is an advantage, that in order to avert the use of the bomb--a weapon suitable for mass warfare--we must prepare for non-atomic warfare on a limited scale, and his comments that our government refuses to learn from post-war military history to alot a budget for the preparation of non-atomic combat is delivered in a manner which is no less urgent than it is objective. General Taylor presents his concept of an adequate military budget, imploring that the confusion resultant from lack of coordination between the Bureau of the Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense be eliminated. In his eloquent plea for a mobile military force, he manifests a high level of technical and analytical awareness, speaking clearly and vigorously to all those whose primary concern is the protection of this country from aggression, and the averting, if possible, of a universally destructive atomic encounter.