Edited here by Gordon A. Craig, this work was written in the first phases of the Second World War, before the outcome could be foreseen. Thus it suffers, as we proceed from Frederick the Great onwards, from a curious diminution of perspective--somewhat like a pair of binoculars gradually going out of focus. At the same time it provides an extremely valuable picture, of World War I especially, as the strategies and aims of the conflict appeared from a vantage point where that kind of warfare could still be viewed (by professionals at least) as a rational form of endeavor. Amateurs of military history will be somewhat surprised to see figures like Clausewitz and Moltke given short shrift, while the Schlieffen Plan comes in for so much intensive scrutiny; but this is again due to the moment in history at which this Particular work happened to be written. The questions of tactical mobility, and of flexibility within a basically, rigid system, are fascinating, and we can still learn much that is useful from Mr. Rosinski's classic study--if we bear in mind exactly where he stood, in time and space.