RANDman Stockfisch is one of those computer-data-input people who has spent his professional career submerged in the murk of one think tank or another -- he's also programmed for the Institute for Defense Analysis. He's also one of those dead-faced birds who takes his weapons-system behavior very seriously, worrying over technical-performance characteristics, cost-effectiveness analysis, and the Strangelovean like, and he's more than prepared -- as he does here at considerable and statistical length -- to concede that something is amiss in the Military-Industrial Complex, management-wise. He's also one of those operational bureaucratic minds -- unlike Daniel Ellsberg -- who wouldn't know a plowshare if it bit him in the decision-making process. Dr. Stockfisch, who is benighted enough to believe that this incredibly stuffy and technical book will provide the ""interested citizen"" with a better understanding of the American war machine and how it might be improved managerially, seems in actuality to be speaking to the power brokers when he calls for more testing prior to procurement, nationalization of weapons development and manufacturing firms (an idea with merit -- if we can't put them out of business), and decentralization of DOD management. Latrine reading for the Joint Chiefs.