WHY?

Marr proposes a grand theory of truth designed to reconcile some of philosophy’s most intractable conundrums.

The author contends that some of the questions that perennially plague philosophers could simply be settled if only a comprehensive account of truth could be devised. With much more intellectual ambition than rigor, Marr offers precisely this: an account of truth, though not one that answers or even discusses the thorny problems that historically arise within the field of epistemology. The author parses “truth” into four parts, the first of which is knowledge, the only aspect of the truth that is entirely free of subjectivity, the “the final arbiter in matters that can be decided on the basis of logic and reason.” (Marr never furnishes a thorough definition of knowledge or reason, seeming to equate them with the empirical findings of science.) The other aspects of truth he identifies—justice, love, and beauty—each permit the introduction of some measure of subjective determination. Again, none of these elements are scrupulously defined or even discussed in detail. On the basis of this threadbare discussion, which amounts to little more than brute postulation, Marr claims to solve a host of stubborn philosophical problems, including the presence of evil in the world and the contest between free will and determinism. These issues are covered in brief chapters that avoid a serious discussion of the relevant philosophical literature (a bibliography does cite Plato, Aristotle, the Bible, and contemporary works of film and literature).

The author presents an objective and universal account of morality, which he reduces to a “refined Golden Rule”: “Honoring the equal rights of all to their life, liberty, property and self-defense, to be free from violation through force or fraud.” He never discusses any of the historical challenges that attach to any theory of rights, nor does he provide the reader with any evidence that he is familiar with them. In the place of disciplined analysis, Marr substitutes rhapsodic paeans to the concept of truth. “Truth itself is the Holy of Holies, the universe its temple and the souls who seek it are its apostles,” he writes. “God’s true temple, Truth, should be the ultimate pursuit of our lives, and every waking moment we have in it.” The author claims to seek some detente between religion and reason while consistently reducing religion to “manufactured, ‘revealed’ myths.” Marr quickly dismisses the possibilities of revelation, supernatural events, and prophesy, as well as the existence of “interactive revealed gods,” claiming that only “hearsay evidence” exists for them, making it seem that he is wholly oblivious to both the philosophical and religious traditions that discuss these ideas. As intellectually undercooked as this book is, one can’t help but be impressed by the author’s commitment to finding an account of the truth that is not only comprehensive but also practical; Marr should be commended for interpreting philosophy as a guide to human affairs. However, this is simply not a serious work of philosophy but rather an assemblage of grandiose pronouncements.

An unsatisfying philosophical work that lacks intellectual meticulousness and historical rigor.