THE BATTLE OF THE GENERALS

While scholars and soldiers have long debated the Falaise campaign that developed within weeks of the 1944 invasion of occupied France, Blumenson (the US Army's official historian; Patton, 1985, etc.) offers a savvy, comprehensive overview of the battle that might well have brought WW II to an earlier end in the European theater. Drawing on source material that's disclosed piecemeal throughout the text, the author first provides scene-setting perspectives on the post-D-day situation. Having established a secure lodgement area in Normandy, Anglo-American forces (reinforced by Canadian, Free French, and Polish units) discovered that they'd nearly encircled German defenders in a narrow salient surmounted by Falaise, a small town in the Calvados region. Although the Allies eventually closed the gap, Blumenson quotes a contemporary RAF analysis that concludes that at least 240,000 Wehrmacht troops avoided death or capture on the Cotentin Peninsula, crossed the Seine with much of their heavy equipment, and lived to fight another day. In assessing blame for the great escape—which yielded the Allies a welcome (if less than complete) victory—the author faults Eisenhower (as well as his two top field generals, Omar Bradley and Bernard Montgomery) for failing to remember that destruction of an enemy, not the taking of terrain, is the quickest way to win a war. He also criticizes Eisenhower for ceding lieutenants like Montgomery an overly free hand to run their own shows and for confining himself too long to the tactical estimates of Overlord's planners. Also covered are the mutinous behavior of a French officer; the poor performance of a badly led Canadian division; the freewheeling Patton's subordinate position in the chain of command; and other factors that let a notable opportunity slip from the grasp of the Allies. An absorbing and authoritative account with substantial appeal to a general readership. (Twenty photos and five maps—not seen)