CONFRONTING SADDAM HUSSEIN

Sober overview of the complicated reasoning behind the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its disastrous ramifications, which still reverberate today.

Veteran historian Leffler, who won the Bancroft Prize for his 1993 book, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War, builds his latest political study around interviews with participants designed “to supplement and complement the written record, not replace it.” He closely examines the actions and thinking of George W. Bush and his so-called Vulcans—as Condoleezza Rice’s group of foreign policy advisers were called—after the events of 9/11 prompted a “war of terror” that was conducted without adequate preparation and planning, especially in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. While much of this territory has been covered before, Leffler adds useful contextual detail, beginning with a detailed biography of Saddam Hussein, who was especially brutal in his political and military tactics—e.g., gassing his own people. Because of Hussein’s known lying about his buildup of biological and chemical weapons, support of terrorism, hatred of Zionism, and general grandiose ambitions for a pan-Arab unity led by himself, the U.S. was already deeply wary of his regime before 9/11. The author asserts that paying close attention to Hussein’s possible possession of weapons of mass destruction was a fairly reasonable reaction to his proven heinous behavior, and the Americans, shaken by the inability to prevent 9/11, were keen to remove any chances another such attack could happen again. Leffler emphasizes Bush’s reliance on “coercive diplomacy” to pressure Hussein to destroy his weapons, and he shows that the president did not necessarily want to go to war. Ultimately, however, he was ill-served by his subordinates, especially Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who fostered a poisonous, backbiting atmosphere among colleagues.

Not groundbreaking but Leffler effectively demonstrates the nuances involved in the “dilemmas of statecraft.”