The final two volumes of a seven-volume published version of colloquia held in Washington over the past five years, sponsored by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. Godson was instrumental in establishing the Consortium back in 1979 to promote teaching and intelligence policy studies under the auspices of the National Strategy Information Center. He is an associate professor of government at Georgetown and a consultant to the National Security Council and to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). The first five volumes probed the topics of the elements of intelligence, analysis and estimates, counterintelligence, covert action, and clandestine collection. Volume Six looks into the matter of domestic intelligence, and Seven explores the general questions of intelligence policy. In general, both volumes tackle the problems engendered by the post-Watergate congressional and media-propelled reaction against the intelligence establishment, particularly the CIA and the FBI. This reaction was reflected in the Carter Administration's anti-spy stance, evidenced by Carter's elimination of the PFIAB (a decision which had to be to reversed when Carter realized how his foreign policy was being botched). The prevailing philosphy propounded here is that, as Alfred Regnery writes, ""intelligence law must be ruled by balance and by judgment, and by a recognition that society is controlled by competing forces,"" some of which are subversive. What is missing here is any reasoned argument against more intrusion and espionage. One will look in vain to find any representation for the side that believes that inflitration or surveillance represents a repeal of the Bill of Rights. Just about every participant has some direct, official link to intelligence matters, either as congressional staffers or policy board members. The closing volume discusses the question of what intelligence processes and institutions are needed for policy formulation in the 1980's. The tension in this discussion is between the Stansfield Turner strain that argues that the ""ethic of intelligence is independence from policy,"" and the opinion of such as the National Security Council's Kenneth de Graffenreid, who argues that ""there is no such thing as apolitical intelligence policy."" Some distinguished names take part in these discussions, such as Paul Seabury, Richard Pipes, Ross Munro, and Laurence Silberman. But the fact that basically only the establishment opinion is represented leaves the reader feeling cheated of any lively debate--almost as if one were sitting in on a meeting of spooks talking shop.