A new and very discursive approach to world law, which begins by comparing third-party adjudication with more primitive forms of settlement. Frank contends that international decision-making is possible without either a separate international legislature or a coercive supra-national authority. His critique of the present World Court is enlightening, but his prescriptions for new institutional arrangements remain nebulous. His historical retrospectives are interesting too; but he skirts key issues from Nuremberg to the Eichmann trial and the international-legality of the U.S. presence in Vietnam. His discussion of the nature of law displays considerable philosophical sensitivity, but his analysis of ""impartiality"" tends to convert ideological issues into psychological ones. Franck ends with a plea for pragmatism, pluralism, and Wechslerian ""neutral principles."" Having failed, however, to meet the problems of national sovereignty and militarism implicit in his assertion that ""all law can only operate within a general framework of applied consensus or compromise,"" he risks the dissent even of sympathetic readers--world law without world government remains a red herring. Footnotes.