EIGHTEEN DAYS IN OCTOBER

A clinical dissection of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, published in time for the 50th anniversary.

In a book he has been researching for 20 years, visiting battle sites and poring over archival documents, Kaufman clearly delineates the conflict, both the immediate aftermath and the long-term effects. He examines the military buildup in terms of Israel’s use of aerial power to destroy Egyptian and Syrian forces and how Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser and Syria’s Hafez el-Assad calculated their revenge. Despite intelligence reports, the Israeli military high command, led by Moshe Dayan, under the auspices of Golda Meir, dismissed alarms of imminent attack and was completely unprepared for a Syrian commando attack on Oct. 6. As Kaufman recounts in a play-by-play narrative, there were no tanks on the ground and few planes in the sky, and everything relied on quick improvisation. “Prior to the war,” writes the author, “the dictionaries of the world defined the Hebrew word mikhdal as a ‘failure to carry out something important.’ After the war, the word took on a new meaning, one that survives to this day: ‘a fiasco as monumental as the IDF’s failures in the opening days of the Yom Kippur War.’ ” Although each side claimed victory, Kaufman underscores that Israel had achieved its primary goal: “Egypt’s days of waging war against Israel were over.” Moreover, on March 18, 1974, the Arab oil embargo was lifted. This subject has been covered from a variety of historical and cultural perspectives, perhaps most memorably by Michael Oren in Six Days of War, but Kaufman’s contribution is a valuable addition to the literature. The book should prove useful for students of modern Middle East history as well as anyone interested in the mechanics of how the Arab-Israeli conflict has remained seemingly intractable for decades.

Engaging, evenhanded account of a major Middle East conflict that still resonates today.