WHILE ISRAEL SLEPT

A journalistic investigation, laced with advocacy, into the failure of Israeli intelligence to foresee a deadly attack.

Journalists Katz and Bohbot open by dismissing the idea that the Hamas-led incursion of Oct. 7, 2023, was akin to 9/11. Instead, they liken it to the Dec. 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor as a sequence of misread indicators that something bad was about to happen. So lax was the monitoring of the Gaza border, they note, that Hamas “didn’t use even a single tunnel,” even as Israeli Defense Forces intelligence assumed that Hamas wouldn’t dare cross the border openly. Another missed sign was the removal of protective fabric from rocket-launch pits within Gaza, a prelude to a rocket attack, although Hamas said that it was a drill. “Israel possessed all the intelligence to piece together Hamas’s plans, but the IDF never connected it into a comprehensive picture to understand what was happening right before their eyes,” the authors charge. One proximate cause of the failure, they hold, was the IDF’s complacency about the “iron wall” that divided Gaza and Israel, “believed to be impenetrable,” but the larger issue was that different agencies weren’t talking to each other and sharing intelligence that might have been stitched into a coherent whole. An interesting point, if untestable, is that the division in Israeli society wrought by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s effort to reduce the power of the nation’s judiciary revealed a weakness that lent itself to attack. Controversially, the authors insist that the IDF’s response to the attack took great pains to spare civilian lives and “refrain from preemptive action that could lead to a wider war.” They close with a set of policy recommendations, including taking care not to alienate the U.S., as happened during the Biden presidency, and enlisting Mossad, which operates internationally, to aid with internal intelligence.

Arguable at points, but a worthy contribution to the literature of Middle Eastern geopolitics.