The forceful, quiet and disturbingly disillusioned view of methods by which the Communists negotiate comes to us from a...

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HOW COMMUNISTS NEGOTIATE

The forceful, quiet and disturbingly disillusioned view of methods by which the Communists negotiate comes to us from a person qualified to analyze them. As senior delegate and chief of the United Nations until May 22, 1952 at the Korean armistice conference, Admiral Joy observed both methods and results. He discusses techniques in progression; the setting of the stage (an American policy mistake was to make the first direct appeal for truce settlement) -- with armed guards, etc.; the nature of the Communist delegation (ultimate authority rested here with Red China); the loaded agenda which amounted to a proposal of a set of conclusions (we avoided this error but fell into another, of succession in putting the truce line first); incidents such as marching armed forces through the conference area; delays and roadblocks created by discussing a screening issue or introducing spurious issues; premeditated crimes -- or going against agreements (the tendency to build up the military in a truce period); veto and denial or distortion of truth. Admiral Joy uses the bitter lessons learned from his Korean experience with a foe that wished to misrepresent the situation in its favor to the world, placing this above compromise in behalf of peace (concessions equaled weakness to them). We must negotiate not only from strength but with strength -- and even negotiate only when the ends of freedom are served. Important and authoritative coverage.

Pub Date: Nov. 15, 1955

ISBN: N/A

Page Count: -

Publisher: Macmillan

Review Posted Online: N/A

Kirkus Reviews Issue: Nov. 1, 1955