THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT

by ‧ RELEASE DATE: Sept. 24, 1973

In Miranda v. Arizona (1966) which required police to warn suspects of their rights to remain silent and to counsel, the Supreme Court struck directly at established forms of harsh police interrogation, merging divergent lines of state and federal legal development. Since the early court decisions of the '30's standards in confession cases have gradually shifted from a reliance on due process notions of trustworthiness and of what constitutes a fair trial to an emphasis on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda rested on the assumption that flaws in the interrogation process could be remedied by making the process conform to the adversary model that prevails in the courtroom, but as Professor Stephens vigorously demonstrates through several empirical studies, including a new one of his own, Miranda warnings have been widely ineffective in helping suspects claim or even comprehend their rights. Stephens traces the development of confession law, including a percipient discussion of the stringent limitations imposed on Miranda's range by the Court's subsequent unwillingness to disturb guilty pleas. This scholarly, cogent analysis of an area of the law not noted for its consistency is primarily for lawyers and social scientists, but lucid enough to be comprehensible to all seriously interested in the possibilities and limitations of criminal law reform.

Pub Date: Sept. 24, 1973

ISBN: N/A

Page Count: -

Publisher: Univ. of Tennessee

Review Posted Online: N/A

Kirkus Reviews Issue: Sept. 1, 1973

Categories: NONFICTION