ROOM 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-18

by Patrick Beesly ‧ RELEASE DATE: Sept. 26, 1983

Because of Britain's slowness in declassifying official documents, it has fallen to the leading authority on British WW II naval intelligence (Very Special Intelligence, 1978) to make first use of the files on British WW I naval intelligence--opened only in 1976 and after, and still not fully. The new material does not justify Beesly's claim that Room 40, as the operation was known, equalled WW IFs famed Bletchley Park in its effect on the war's outcome; neither do the new details substantially alter our understanding of key incidents and episodes--the Battle of Dogger Bank, the sinking of the Lusitania, the Battle of Jutland, the Zimmerman telegram, U-boat warfare. In the absence of footnotes, indeed, one cannot pinpoint what the documentary sources add to long-published recollections--notably those of Room 40's flamboyant chief, Admiral Sir William Reginald (""Blinker"") Hall. Nonetheless Beesly makes several distinct contributions--of varying interest to various audiences, and to Americans. He describes the organization and personnel of Room 40--a pioneering operation, and in truth Bletchley Park's forerunner; also, how it procured German naval codes (some dandy tales), and its relations with the Admiralty. . . which, in his view, seldom made best use of Room 40 or its material. (Beesly is clubby--""another old Etonian""--but tart.) With a Room 40 perspective, he expands on both submarine and surface warfare: knowledge of U-boat whereabouts, for instance, enabled shipping to be routed evasively; the German High Seas Fleet was denied ""the advantage of surprise."" From Room 40 research (by John Light, preparing a book on the subject), he scrutinizes the Lusitania question: did Churchill have advance knowledge of the danger, and sacrifice the Lusitania to get America into the war? Narrowing the possibilities, he concludes that such is not likely--but not impossible either: it remains a fascinating conundrum. He gives similarly close attention, echoing Hall's own relish, to the interception of the Zimmerman telegram--offering Mexico part of the American Southwest in return for an alliance--which indeed did precipitate American entrance into the war: the Room 40 source had to be concealed, and both Wilson and the American public misled in varying degrees. (""Alone I did it,"" Hall chortled.) He also lays out certain of Hall's clandestine activities--vis-à-vis the Irish (tenuously) and, through a US embassy official, German espionage in the Americas. Neither a popular work nor a broadly interpretive one (in the Ronald Lewin or Peter Calvocoressi tradition)--but rewarding in parts for SIGINT buffs, the naval following, and students of World War I.

Pub Date: Sept. 26, 1983

ISBN: N/A

Page Count: -

Publisher: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich

Review Posted Online: N/A

Kirkus Reviews Issue: Sept. 1, 1983

Categories: NONFICTION