THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

by Robert A. -- Ed. Divine ‧ RELEASE DATE: Aug. 1, 1971

Possibly because most were written during or shortly after the event, this collection of essays by commentators of various political stripes takes a narrow view of the missile crisis: the immediate moves of the antagonists and speculation about their tactics. Only Adam Ulam, the Harvard Kremlinologist, seriously pursues the geopolitical context, offering the theory that Khrushchev precipitated the crisis to stave off Chinese and West German nuclear demands. I. F. Stone questions telegraphically whether in the wake of JFK's ""Communism is not negotiable"" remark, the U.S. might have been planning another Cuban invasion. For the rest, the views are predictable and marginally enlightening: Stewart Alsop thinks the crisis was a ""great moment in American history"" in which we foiled Soviet attempts to deceive; Roger Hagan of the Committees of Correspondence asks why JFK failed to avail himself of diplomatic means; State Department liberal Roger Hilsman wonders why the Soviets ""did it"" and later debates with Ronald Steel of the New York Review on some out-of-context quotations; Dean Acheson conjectures that the U.S. blockade didn't work and it was lucky Khrushchev turned tail. Khrushchev's statement itself blames U.S. aggressiveness, but fails to explain why he initially lied about missile deployment and then readily conceded to Kennedy's ultimatum; JFK's histrionic T.V. address is also reprinted. Studies on the Left contributor Dewart points out his public inconsistencies on the potency of the missiles, while Mario Lazo, a Cuban exile, says the U.S. should have finished Castro off. Laden with the confusion and anxiety of the event more than with clear analysis, the collection is not sharpened by Divine's introduction.

Pub Date: Aug. 1, 1971

ISBN: N/A

Page Count: -

Publisher: Quadrangle

Review Posted Online: N/A

Kirkus Reviews Issue: Aug. 1, 1971

Categories: NONFICTION