THE PRICE OF POWER: Kissinger in the Nixon White House

by Seymour M. Hersh ‧ RELEASE DATE: June 13, 1983

Kissinger himself, like him or loathe him, is lots more interesting to read. Tad Szulc (The Illusion of Peace) and William Shawcross (Sideshow), writing on Kissinger-Nixon foreign policy, contributed to the historical record. Roger Morris (Uncertain Greatness) did a scathing number on Kissinger the double-dealer. But Hersh's massive dossier on Kissinger's derelictions as Nixon's National Security Advisor doesn't amount to much more than the charges that have already been aired, and confirmed or denied, in the media--multiplied and strung out, moreover, until they become tedious. Kissinger, of course, has denied (""a slimy lie"") that he played both sides of the fence in the 1968 presidential election, offering to show the Humphrey camp a file of nasty items on HHH while he was ingratiating himself with Nixon. (Brzezinski and Richard Allen, two of Kissinger's rivals and future National Security Advisors, have confirmed their stories on the matter; but Ted Van Dyke, a Humphrey aide who told Hersh about a letter from Kissinger offering help after Humphrey's late surge in the polls, says he doesn't remember telling Hersh that Kissinger was ""a both-sides-of-the-street kind of guy."") There will undoubtedly be further exchanges, because Hersh has relied to a great extent on myriad interviews, sometimes leaving his sources unattributed. The book thus rests on the shaky ground of investigative reporting, rather than the firmer, documented terrain of diplomatic history. Many of Hersh's sources, moreover, have been in jail for their Watergate shenanigans, so his critics can be forgiven for questioning their reliability. Still, not that much is surprising. The allegation that Kissinger leaked information regarding LBJ's negotiations with the Vietnamese just before the 1968 election, allowing Nixon's forces to inform Hanoi that it could get a better deal from him, is culled from a casual comment in Nixon's memoirs. Other stories--the incessant bureaucratic backbiting, Nixon getting drunk, Kissinger demeaning his staffers, or calling Secretary of State Rogers a ""fag,"" or labeling CBS reporter Marvin Kalb a Romanian spy (because Nixon liked to think the press was full of Communists)--are the sort of stuff that, sadly, has come to be expected. On more substantive ground, Hersh says: that Kissinger's staff set up the system for double reporting that masked the Cambodia bombing; that Greek-American businessman Thomas Pappas funnelled money from the Greek junta into Nixon's campaign coffers (the money had come from the CIA in the first place); that Kissinger undermined Rogers' efforts to negotiate a Mideastern peace out of spite; that Kissinger concurred in Nixon's desire to launch air strikes against the PLO in 1970 (a plan deftly scotched by Defense Secretary Laird, who, with Rogers, was a constant source of irritation for Kissinger and the subject of hateful diatribes by Nixon); and that Nixon upset Kissinger's peace plan with the Vietnamese in 1972 because a private poll showed he would lose votes from the ""hardhats"" if an agreement was signed before the election. Kissinger is shown to be mad about power, whether the power to launch B-52 strikes against Hanoi or the trivial power to make or break a Washington party. The disparity in importance between these is blunted by repetition and volume, leaving a bad taste not only about Kissinger but about Hersh's account, too. Sensational, perhaps, in the short run; but Shawcross, for instance, will be around much longer.

Pub Date: June 13, 1983

ISBN: N/A

Page Count: -

Publisher: Summit

Review Posted Online: N/A

Kirkus Reviews Issue: June 1, 1983

Categories: NONFICTION