Earlier this year, a retired Army colonel (see George Walton's The Tarnished Shield, KR, p. 52) wrote a somewhat similar if less detailed and progressive book than lieutenant Colonel Hauser (another ""in-house critic"") offers here. To be sure, the military machine is in trouble over. race, drugs, dissent, and a sullied public image as the Vietnam nightmare winds down, but ""The Army will survive. . . reforms are being debated, and individual commanders and staff officers are experimenting with new leadership, training, and management techniques."" This is where the colonels part company -- Walton advocating a return to strict discipline whereas the more sophisticated Hauser proposes a wider range of solutions from ""bifurcation"" (foreign vs. domestic troops, one ""fighting"" the other ""supporting"") to a similar division between careerists (""command specialists"" vs. ""a relatively small number of generalists""). Hauser, the wiser analyst, is concerned that the Army survive the Vietnam backlash -- ""To the public, particularly the molders of opinion in media and academia, the message is that they should not press too hard for immediate and radical reform."" It will come, he claims, when the boys with scrambled eggs on their caps are ready. But of all the institutions we know, the military is least ready to change. SNAFU is still an operative concept and we wonder if Colonel Hauser has not been blinded by the general condition?