This is subtitled ""Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam"" and Col. Clutterbuck, O.B.E., draws not only upon his own...

READ REVIEW

THE LONG, LONG WAR

This is subtitled ""Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam"" and Col. Clutterbuck, O.B.E., draws not only upon his own experience in suppressing the Communist guerrillas in Malaya, but also on that of many of his colleagues, Malayan, British and American. This is in order to point out what was done right (in Malaya) and wrong (in Vietnam). Once his basic assumption, that such a contrast is feasible, is accepted, there is a great deal to be learned here. This assumption is held by those determining the course of events in South Vietnam. In 1962-1963, the Colonel's job was to instruct U.S. officers in the art of counterinsurgency. Simply stated, his method was ""grassroots intelligence"" used to keep the guerrilla bands fragmented and moving. Obviously it is much too late to do this to the NFL: and thus one is left (after a frightening, enlightening tour of the underworld of coercion, bribery and treason) with the feeling that it is academic. Unless one agrees that ""this kind of war has clearly come to stay,"" that ""we"" are always going to be pitted against ""them,"" and that the sort of victory achieved in Malaya is worth ten years of selective terrorism.

Pub Date: N/A

ISBN: N/A

Page Count: -

Publisher: Praeger

Review Posted Online: N/A

Kirkus Reviews Issue: May 1, 1966

Close Quickview