The definitive resource for understanding this deeply troubling episode in the 20th century’s greatest horror. (8 pages...
Essays by military and Holocaust historians (whose answers to the question in the subtitle vary widely), supplemented with relevant primary documents.
Editors Neufeld (The Rocket and the Reich, 1994) and Berenbaum (CEO/Survivors of the Shoah Visual History Foundation) have assembled a myriad of replies to “one of the most basic questions that students of the Holocaust ask” and are faithful to their goal of presenting all sides of the debate. Some, like Neufeld himself, argue that bombing would have been “a failure under any circumstances” (or, in the words of contributor James H. Kitchens, “a chimera”). Contrariwise, Richard G. Davis (among others) submits that attacking the death camp would have sent “the strongest possible message to the Nazis” and “would not have seriously delayed the accomplishment of other goals.” In between these two positions lies the essence of the debate, and an impressive assortment of authorities’ attempts to answer its various questions. Did the Allies know what was going on in Auschwitz-Birkenau? (Yes, but the Nazis had already killed five million Jews by the time the Allies invaded Normandy.) Did Allied bombers have the range to reach the camp deep in Poland? (Yes, but not until early in 1944 when the US established an air base in southern Italy.) Would a raid have been effective? (Virtually everyone acknowledges that bombing in 1944 was highly inaccurate, that multiple attacks would have been necessary, and that innocent inmates—perhaps hundreds or thousands—would have been killed.) Other writers examine the moral issues. Walter Laqueur observes that “saving Jewish lives” was not a high priority; Henry L. Feingold attributes the inaction to “mere indifference or moral obtuseness”; and Deborah E. Lipstadt condemns the bystanders, noting that a person “who takes no action becomes a facilitator.” Wisely, the editors include much of the documentary evidence.
The definitive resource for understanding this deeply troubling episode in the 20th century’s greatest horror. (8 pages b&w photos, 4 maps)Pub Date: Aug. 1, 2000
ISBN: 0-312-19838-8
Page Count: 368
Publisher: St. Martin's
Review Posted Online: May 19, 2010
Kirkus Reviews Issue: May 15, 2000
BOOK REVIEW
BOOK REVIEW
A well-researched and original, if somewhat overwrought, history of Napoleon's fall from power, from his return from Moscow to his death in 1821 on the island of St. Helena. Hamilton-Williams (Waterloo: New Perspectives, not reviewed) has delved deeply into the military and diplomatic history of the last three years of Napoleon's reign and into the machinations of Talleyrand, his longtime foreign minister, and FouchÇ, his chief of police, both of whom played critical roles in his fall. The author's thesis is that the fall was brought about not by military failure, even at Waterloo, but by a series of carefully orchestrated betrayals. He argues that but for these Napoleon would have been able to defeat the divided allies in 1814, before his exile to Elba; and indeed the former emperor's popularity in France was such that, landing 11 months later with 1,100 men, it took only 20 days for him to retake France without casualties. Hamilton- Williams undercuts his argument that the allies should have accepted Napoleon's protestations of peace by noting that ``if he, Napoleon, could beat Wellington and Blucher...all that had been lost since 1812 might be regained.'' He also neglects the possibility that the Allies, after more than a decade of war, might have viewed Napoleon's overtures with some skepticism. The author's villains are the Bourbons, in particular the heir to the French throne, the comte d'Artois, whose intelligence organization committed a number of assassinations, including poisoning Napoleon himself (for which the evidence is indeed persuasive); and the British government, a ``contemptible clique,'' and its foreign minister, Castlereagh. Hamilton-Williams tells a stirring story, revealing much new material, but his partisanship is such that even Julius Caesar receives a whiff of grapeshot for setting his ``defiling foot'' on French soil. The illustrations, however, are outstanding.
Pub Date: March 15, 1995
ISBN: 0-471-11862-1
Page Count: 384
Publisher: Wiley
Review Posted Online: May 19, 2010
Kirkus Reviews Issue: Feb. 1, 1995
A collection of perceptive essays from a top Asian scholar who sheds considerable light on how Japan managed to become a world- class economic power following its defeat in WW II. Among other arresting judgments, Johnson (Pacific International Relations/Univ. of California, San Diego; MITI and the Japanese Miracle, 1981) contends that samurai capitalism is quite unlike its Darwinian equivalents in Europe and North America on several important counts. To begin with, he states, the island nation engages in an effective form of producer economics that views markets as means, not ends. In addition, respected government ministries provide domestic industry with administrative guidance that permits corporate enterprises to pursue essentially mercantile goals without paying much attention to the interests of either employees or stockholders. The author dates the ascendancy of this prestigious, professional bureaucracy (which created what he calls a developmental state) to the destruction of Japan's military during the US occupation. Mounting trade deficits and the end of the Cold War have induced Washington to reappraise America's relations with Dai Nihon and the Far Eastern countries that have followed its economic lead. For the most part, Johnson concludes, neither US policy makers nor the mass media have a realistic understanding of how Japan's commercial practices (which have precious little concern for the welfare of home-front consumers) differ from those in the West. Expanding on this theme, he examines language barriers, Tokyo's bonds with nations comprising what it once referred to as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the reform-resistant system that passes for democratic politics in Japan. Addressed as well is the outlook for a renewal of the ties that once bound the US to an ally that no longer appears to value its gaijin security blanket. Authoritative perspectives on a consequential country that remains indominatably foreign for most of the West. (Graphs and tabular material)
Pub Date: March 1, 1995
ISBN: 0-393-03739-8
Page Count: 352
Publisher: Norton
Review Posted Online: May 19, 2010
Kirkus Reviews Issue: Feb. 1, 1995
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