KIRKUS REVIEW
An evaluation of the causes of German defeat, analyzed from interrogations of senior German officers, and a pre-D-day study of the German army, by an officer of the Intelligence Staff of the First Canadian Army. Here, with ample examination, are the inherent symptoms of defeat -- the failure of Hitler as a military strategist, the effects of too much discipline and ignorance, the fatal weaknesses in the General Staff, the mistakes made early at Gibraltar, Crete, with Russia, with the United States, at El Alamein, and the total effectiveness of the Invasion. There is discussion of personalities as well as battles, and the whole underlines the ways in which victory for the Allies was also made possible by the inherent shortcomings in German leaders and people. A book for the student of history as well as strategy, of national as well as individual psychology, this claims accuracy in its material and facts, and is geared to the layman's intelligence. But again- it will have to face the hurdle of the reluctance of the general reading public to read books about the war. It will find its place in public libraries.