Togo was Foreign Minister at the time of Pearl Harbor and, after a period of political eclipse, resumed this post to speed Japan's peace negotiations; he is therefor more familiar than anyone else with the underlying policies of his country at two critical points. Shortly before his death in an American military hospital (he was then serving a twenty year sentence on charges of ""conspiracy to wage aggressive war"") Togo put into his family's safekeeping elaborate notes on his youth (not included here) and his service in the Konoe and Suzuki cabinets. The notes, pedantic and impersonal, not only exonerate Togo himself of any militant designs but place an embarrassing amount of responsibility at the door of the United States. The embargo on petroleum products all but forced Japan into the war: Roosevelt, according to Togo, was fully aware of this fact and, from sources of secret information, knew thoroughly the plans and thinking of the Japanese leaders: the duplicity and delaying tactics in Washington were caused entirely by America. His justification, coupled with the light the book sheds on the power alignments within Japan and the broad diplomatic policies that were followed, is worthy of special interest in terms of history and of importance to the student or expert in Far Eastern affairs; it is newsworthy as a presentation of the japanese grounds for their actions.