Valor vs. red tape with the soul of democracy at stake.
The author of megaselling novels in the techno/gung-ho genre (The Bear and the Dragon, 2000, etc.) that he practically invented adds an untimely entry to his body of nonfiction dissections (Every Man a Tiger, 1999, etc.) of what makes our military so great: everything you wanted to know about Special Forces except for Afghanistan.
Teamed this time with a retired former chief of US Special Operations Command, Clancy delves into the origins and evolution of the Special Forces concept. Presidents Kennedy and Reagan get special credit for a relevant grasp of realpolitik: the need for a new kind of force capable of Cold War dirty tricks, counterinsurgencies, and holding terrorists to account for their crimes anywhere in the world. Some action vignettes from SF roots in WWII and Vietnam rival Clancy fiction, but things get bogged down with military trivia as the author and General Stiner interweave narratives (liberally laced with the kind of DOD jargon that makes a ship a “naval platform” and an airplane an “aviation asset”) on the Achille Lauro (hijacked cruise liner) incident, “taking down” Noriega's Panama, and other actions. The central theme is a somewhat predictable one of guys in the field taking heat, or worse, because Washington never quite gets it. For example, only after Vietnam, when the Pentagon finally allows that the standard US ground soldier is frighteningly inept at forging good relations with “friendlies,” does that become a top SF training priority. Also well documented is the depth and breadth of opposition to any concept of elite units by mainstream military commanders who tend to see Special Ops planners as “princes of darkness” out to rob the “Big Army” of budget and resources. Obviously caught with the book already in the publishing pipeline when the 2001 War on Terrorism was declared, Clancy awkwardly tacks on a final chapter to cover repercussions of September 11 (but not including any military operations in Afghanistan), which adds nothing original either in his analysis of the Al Qaeda brand of terrorism or proposed countermeasures.
Valor vs. red tape with the soul of democracy at stake.Pub Date: Feb. 1, 2001
ISBN: 0-399-14783-7
Page Count: 560
Publisher: Putnam
Review Posted Online: June 24, 2010
Kirkus Reviews Issue: Dec. 15, 2001
Los Angeles Times correspondent Shogan argues that FDR negotiated harshly and covertly with a beleaguered Winston Churchill in the celebrated 1940 deal that marked the commencement of Anglo-American cooperation in WW II. The story's outline is well-known: While England was fighting for survival in the Battle of Britain, President Roosevelt braved isolationist sentiment to trade a handful of old destroyers (badly needed by the Royal Navy to counter the German U-boat onslaught) for American bases in British colonies. The deal laid the foundation for the Atlantic Alliance that ultimately won the war against Hitler. In this careful, step-by-step review of the negotiations leading to the accord, Shogan argues that ``in implementing the destroyer deal, Roosevelt followed a pattern of manipulation and concealment'' that breached his trust as president. The author also contends that Roosevelt's pursuit of a policy he knew to be unacceptable to the isolationist American public and contrary to the Walsh Amendment, which restricted transfers of military matÇriel abroad, set a precedent for the postwar buildup of excessive presidential power. Shogan (The Riddle of Power, 1991, etc.) draws a convincing portrait of a chief executive determined on the one hand to get the best bargain he could for the United States (without excessive regard for legal niceties) and on the other to help Britain while avoiding any overt entanglement with the war effort during a crucial election year. In the end, as Shogan points out, Roosevelt presented Congress with a fait accompli. The author might have noted the emergency nature of Britain's plight, however, and the fact that other presidents, including Abraham Lincoln, took actions of similarly questionable legality during national crises. A detailed and absorbing analysis, although not all readers will agree with Shogan's critical view of FDR's actions and his tracing of modern presidential abuses to the destroyers-for-bases accord.
Pub Date: April 1, 1995
ISBN: 0-689-12160-1
Page Count: 320
Publisher: Scribner
Review Posted Online: June 24, 2010
Kirkus Reviews Issue: Feb. 15, 1995
BOOK REVIEW
BOOK REVIEW
BOOK REVIEW
Huge, gripping novelistic work that assembles the most legally relevant information known about Lee Harvey Oswald to see how he would fare if tried for the murder of JFK. While this is not the last word on Oswald, it does present the State of Texas case so thoroughly that few readers will come to a verdict different from Brown's. A former Special Agent of the Justice Department, Brown is a layman, not a lawyer. He imagines that Oswald survives Ruby's bullet, is charged with Kennedy's murder, the attempted assassination of Governor Connally, and the death of Officer Tippett. The Connally and Tippett trials have been separated from the Kennedy trial, however, and will follow it. Brown also imagines that the 27 volumes of the Warren Commission Report have been published. The prosecution goes to trial thinking that the Warren Report and the Dallas police have handed it an open-and-shut case. Quickly, though, the case against Oswald begins to fold, and the reader realizes that an acquittal lies ahead. The story is how the acquittal is brought about despite the seemingly vast case against Oswald. The prosecutor's witnesses turn out invariably to be witnesses for the defense as the discrepancies between the facts and what the witnesses told the Warren Commission destroy the State's evidence against Oswald. It's all bad news for the prosecution: what the Dallas doctors testify to; what the Dealey Plaza witnesses saw and say; the testimony of those who saw Oswald at places he could not have been (implying an Oswald imposter); the many fake Secret Service agents in Dealey Plaza; the worthless autopsy report from Bethesda; and the absence of motive (many witnesses testify that Oswald liked JFK). Oswald's defender believes his client knew about a conspiracy but didn't commit murder—but Oswald's not on trial for conspiracy. A nose-breaking blow to the lone assassin theory.
Pub Date: Oct. 15, 1992
ISBN: 0-88184-869-7
Page Count: 656
Publisher: N/A
Review Posted Online: May 19, 2010
Kirkus Reviews Issue: Aug. 15, 1992
BOOK REVIEW
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