An engaging study, particularly for students of Civil War military history—and of leadership.
A carefully argued account of “the largest army in American history”—and one that barely survived its commanders.
Civil War historian Wert (Gettysburg, Day Three, 2001, etc.) considers the Army of the Potomac as something of a microcosm of Northern society; its recruits were “awkward on drill fields, rowdy in camps and on city streets, attired in a kaleidoscope of multicolored, ill-fitting uniforms,” spoke many languages, and, at least at the army’s formation in 1861, were wont to think of their officers as equals. Many had joined the army for the money, nothing more. But, Wert asserts, many more joined out of sheer idealism, a motivation that would keep the army, if not a good portion of its soldiers, alive for the duration of the war. Working against that idealism and exuberance was the disdain of the professional officer class, made up of men who were inclined to think of their subordinates as rabble—and who, like George McClellan, were often afflicted by what Abe Lincoln called “the slows,” a seeming reluctance to engage an enemy led by the much more audacious Robert E. Lee. Slowly, Wert shows, the Army of the Potomac shed its lesser poor leaders after being bloodied at places like the Battle of First Bull Run. But McClellan’s overly cautious approach still turned victories into defeats, as at Malvern Hill in July 1862, when he inflicted great damage on Lee’s forces but still withdrew from the field, a turn that “saved Richmond and redirected the war in Virginia.” Interestingly, Wert connects that caution to McClellan’s conservatism otherwise, which caused him to regard Lincoln’s plans for emancipation and the suspension of habeas corpus with horror; McClellan, Wert sympathetically notes, also feared that if his army were destroyed, so too would be the Union. Still, McClellan’s removal from command allowed subsequent generals, especially U.S. Grant, to transform the Army of the Potomac into one of the most consistently effective forces to serve the Union cause.
An engaging study, particularly for students of Civil War military history—and of leadership.Pub Date: April 1, 2005
ISBN: 0-7432-2506-6
Page Count: 560
Publisher: Simon & Schuster
Review Posted Online: May 19, 2010
Kirkus Reviews Issue: Feb. 1, 2005
Los Angeles Times correspondent Shogan argues that FDR negotiated harshly and covertly with a beleaguered Winston Churchill in the celebrated 1940 deal that marked the commencement of Anglo-American cooperation in WW II. The story's outline is well-known: While England was fighting for survival in the Battle of Britain, President Roosevelt braved isolationist sentiment to trade a handful of old destroyers (badly needed by the Royal Navy to counter the German U-boat onslaught) for American bases in British colonies. The deal laid the foundation for the Atlantic Alliance that ultimately won the war against Hitler. In this careful, step-by-step review of the negotiations leading to the accord, Shogan argues that ``in implementing the destroyer deal, Roosevelt followed a pattern of manipulation and concealment'' that breached his trust as president. The author also contends that Roosevelt's pursuit of a policy he knew to be unacceptable to the isolationist American public and contrary to the Walsh Amendment, which restricted transfers of military matÇriel abroad, set a precedent for the postwar buildup of excessive presidential power. Shogan (The Riddle of Power, 1991, etc.) draws a convincing portrait of a chief executive determined on the one hand to get the best bargain he could for the United States (without excessive regard for legal niceties) and on the other to help Britain while avoiding any overt entanglement with the war effort during a crucial election year. In the end, as Shogan points out, Roosevelt presented Congress with a fait accompli. The author might have noted the emergency nature of Britain's plight, however, and the fact that other presidents, including Abraham Lincoln, took actions of similarly questionable legality during national crises. A detailed and absorbing analysis, although not all readers will agree with Shogan's critical view of FDR's actions and his tracing of modern presidential abuses to the destroyers-for-bases accord.
Pub Date: April 1, 1995
ISBN: 0-689-12160-1
Page Count: 320
Publisher: Scribner
Review Posted Online: June 24, 2010
Kirkus Reviews Issue: Feb. 15, 1995
BOOK REVIEW
BOOK REVIEW
BOOK REVIEW
Huge, gripping novelistic work that assembles the most legally relevant information known about Lee Harvey Oswald to see how he would fare if tried for the murder of JFK. While this is not the last word on Oswald, it does present the State of Texas case so thoroughly that few readers will come to a verdict different from Brown's. A former Special Agent of the Justice Department, Brown is a layman, not a lawyer. He imagines that Oswald survives Ruby's bullet, is charged with Kennedy's murder, the attempted assassination of Governor Connally, and the death of Officer Tippett. The Connally and Tippett trials have been separated from the Kennedy trial, however, and will follow it. Brown also imagines that the 27 volumes of the Warren Commission Report have been published. The prosecution goes to trial thinking that the Warren Report and the Dallas police have handed it an open-and-shut case. Quickly, though, the case against Oswald begins to fold, and the reader realizes that an acquittal lies ahead. The story is how the acquittal is brought about despite the seemingly vast case against Oswald. The prosecutor's witnesses turn out invariably to be witnesses for the defense as the discrepancies between the facts and what the witnesses told the Warren Commission destroy the State's evidence against Oswald. It's all bad news for the prosecution: what the Dallas doctors testify to; what the Dealey Plaza witnesses saw and say; the testimony of those who saw Oswald at places he could not have been (implying an Oswald imposter); the many fake Secret Service agents in Dealey Plaza; the worthless autopsy report from Bethesda; and the absence of motive (many witnesses testify that Oswald liked JFK). Oswald's defender believes his client knew about a conspiracy but didn't commit murder—but Oswald's not on trial for conspiracy. A nose-breaking blow to the lone assassin theory.
Pub Date: Oct. 15, 1992
ISBN: 0-88184-869-7
Page Count: 656
Publisher: N/A
Review Posted Online: May 19, 2010
Kirkus Reviews Issue: Aug. 15, 1992
BOOK REVIEW
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